



as an alternative to improved licensing and modernization 
of copyright law was flat-out rejected (ibid.).
200 It is unclear if CJEU’s statement on “seriously discouraging” 
accessing the site could be read to accept educational 
purposes.
201 See discussion and references in notes 169–172 and 
corresponding text.
202 See note 166 and corresponding text.
203 See notes 125–128 and corresponding text.
204 If blocking was indeed as effective as the best claims made 
of it, expansion might not be worthwhile. See Savola (n 118), 
pp. 112–113.
205 See notes 91 and 101 corresponding text. Arnold likely referred 
to the minority of infringing users. Likewise, Charleton J felt 
that blocking would be educational and helpful. See note 172.
206 It can be estimated that both providers and IPR holders have 
used at least 5 million euro in Europe on legal expenses in 
trying to block The Pirate Bay alone. This estimate is based on 
the number of countries, ISPs and the proceedings involved 
when the cost for one provider for one proceedings through 
appeals instances has been reported (where the information 
is available) to run at ca. 100,000 to 300,000 euro (see eg. note 
120). It seems obvious that such expenses cannot be motivated 
by blocking (or resistance thereto) just one site, but both 
parties have more general agenda.
207 In EMI v UPC (n 132), para. 62, a reference was made to an 
attempt to educate the public with campaigns. The impact of 
reducing infringements lasted for only several months before 
returning to the previous level. As noted in the context of 
the research of blocking, there appears to be no evidence to 
suggest that attempts to educate already cognizant persons 
with inefficient blocking is any more useful. A key difference 
is that it shifts some expenses and responsibility to providers.
208 Unfortunately, such measurements and research are also 
often biased, so it may be of limited usefulness, especially 
if the connectivity provider does not wish to expend its 
resources to fighting it.
209 This has also been the only case where detailed public 
research has been notably part of the proceedings. In 
some other cases, this could also have made a difference.
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A. Introduction
1 Legislative instruments that impose information 
obligations on market actors when offering products 
and services or closing transactions with users 
currently exist at various levels and in different 
sectors. The idea underpinning these legal obligations 
is that informed users or consumers will make the 
right choices, and by doing so, will serve not only 
their own personal interests, but also promote wider 
public policy objectives (healthy food, green energy, 
safe investments, privacy-friendly information 
services, etc.). However, the idea of an informed 
user does not take into account the heterogeneity of 
the users nor individual preferences or behavioural 
constraints. This finding is reflected in the Terms 
of Use (ToU) of a Social Network Site (SNS), which 
are meant to inform the user about the rights and 
responsibilities that membership of such a network 
entails. Research suggests that these ToU are rarely 
read by users before agreeing to them. Also, even 
if users were to actually read the ToU, they would 
probably not be able to correctly assess the possible 
implications of these documents. Despite their legal 
duty to draft contract terms in plain and intelligible 
language, or obtain “informed” consent for the 
processing of personal data, market actors continue 
publishing highly unattractive and complex terms 
of service or privacy policies which rarely take 
into consideration the various needs and rights of 
different types of users.
2 Aside from issues regarding the lack of awareness 
and understanding of ToU, an analysis of several 
provisions of ToU of SNS has shown that there is 
cause to be concerned about the imbalance of rights 
and responsibilities between the SNS provider and 
its users.1 It is likely that certain clauses (e.g. with 
regard to the transfer of copyright or exemption of 
liability) will not be upheld before European courts, 
based on consumer protection arguments (e.g. 
because they “cause[…] a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer”; Article 3 of the Unfair 
Terms Directive). 
3 On the basis of contract or consumer rights 
legislation, users may challenge an SNS provider 
in court when they feel that their rights are 
being violated. However, a single user will often 
not be inclined to start a procedure because such 
procedures are time-consuming and expensive. 
Also, consumer claims often have a small value in 
comparison to the resources of the companies that 
they want to bring to court. Hence, the imbalance 
between the effort and cost and the result will often 
discourage consumers from starting judicial action. 
It is therefore the aim of this paper to assess how this 
situation can be remedied. We will examine whether 
an ex post remedy such as the use of collective redress 
mechanisms may provide a solution for consumers 
or users who want to act upon certain consequences 
of the imbalanced ToU of SNS providers. Next to this 
judicial option, we will assesses whether we can 
consider a new manner of establishing standard 
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contracts in a consumer environment. We will focus 
on whether alternative ex ante mechanisms may be 
a solution to provide users with more balanced ToU. 
An example is the use of pre-approved contracts 
where an independent third party will assess and 
approve or disapprove of the use of a company’s ToU. 
If approved, the ToU are valid for a certain amount 
of time and immune for judicial action. Another 
illustration of this approach is where consumer and 
business organisations negotiate standard contracts 
that create an equal balance between business and 
users’ interests. We will also address whether there 
are possibilities to take into account SNS users’ 
individual values or preferences in such standard 
contracts.
I. Ex Post: Collective 
Redress Mechanisms
4 The value of goods or services in consumer contracts 
is often low in comparison to business contracts. It is 
therefore argued that consumers often do not seek 
redress because of the small value of the claim and 
the expensive and time-consuming litigation, which 
results in an imbalance between the efforts and the 
expected compensation. A study commission by the 
European Commission on consumer experiences and 
consumer redress showed that consumers are aware 
of their rights and that they do have some knowledge 
about the existence of redress mechanisms.2 An 
individual court proceeding was the mechanism 
that most consumers recognised. Although they 
considered it to be beneficial because of the legally 
binding decision, most of them were also wary 
to start such a procedure because they perceived 
it as expensive and time-consuming. Consumers 
indicated they would use it only in the most serious 
cases.3 To improve access to justice, Member States 
and the European Union itself have been developing 
other mechanisms such as collective action, 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and small claims 
procedures. However, alternative or online dispute 
resolution4 and small claims procedures5 require 
action from individual users and are currently still 
very much theoretical options with regard to SNS 
ToU. Yet, depending on the developments in SNS, 
this could change in the (near) future, making them 
viable redress options for users. 
5 At the moment there is no coherent legal definition 
of collective redress in the Member States or at the 
EU level. The Commission’s Communication of June 
2013 describes the concept as follows:
Collective redress is a procedural mechanism that allows, 
for reasons of procedural economy and/or efficiency of 
enforcement, many similar legal claims to be bundled into 
a single court action. Collective redress facilitates access to 
justice in particular in cases where the individual damage 
is so low that potential claimants would not think it worth 
pursuing an individual claim. It also strengthens the 
negotiating power of potential claimants and contributes to 
the efficient administration of justice, by avoiding numerous 
proceedings concerning claims resulting from the same 
infringement of law.6
6 The European consumer organisation BEUC (Bureau 
Européen des Unions de Consommateurs) defines the 
concept more simply as “a legal procedure enabling 
many victims of the same harm or loss to obtain 
compensation by way of a single group application to 
court”.7 
7 The concept of collective action is not new, and 
probably the most well-known is the class action 
system of the USA.8 With regard to SNS, several class 
actions have been filed in recent years. In April 2011, 
for instance, a lawsuit was filed in California with 
regard to the ToU of Facebook.  On 26 August 2013, 
the case was settled and confirmed by the Court, 
whereby Facebook agreed to (a) establish a $20 million 
dollar settlement fund and (b) amend its Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities which governs the use 
of its site and to implement additional mechanisms 
giving users more information about and control 
over how their names and portraits are used in 
connection with the feature of ‘Sponsored Stories’.9 
In the aftermath of this case, Facebook announced 
on 29 August 2013 that it would update its Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities and its Data Use Policy. 
8 In the EU, several Member States have adopted a form 
of collective action that can be divided into three 
broad categories:10 group actions, representative 
actions and test procedures. In group actions, an 
exactly defined category of persons will bring an 
action to enforce their individual claims together, 
in one procedure, in accordance with specific rules 
designed for such purpose.11 In a representative 
collective action, an organisation, a state authority 
or an individual on behalf of a group can start a 
procedure. In contrast to the collective action, the 
individuals that are represented are not part of the 
procedure.12  Lastly, in a test procedure, an individual 
claim is tested that makes it a precedent for future 
similar cases.13 
9 In total, 17 Member States have installed a collective 
redress procedure.14 In the context of its Consumer 
Policy Strategy 2007-2013, the Commission ordered 
two studies: one on consumer evaluation of available 
redress mechanisms15 and the other which evaluated 
the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress 
mechanisms in the EU. 16 These studies show that 
they are not widely used and that they tend to be very 
different, resulting in diverse results. A comparative 
study found that a considerable heterogeneity exists 
within the three broad categories (supra), which 
implies that essential features of collective actions 
are regulated in diverging ways.17 Overall, the studies 
and consultations of the Commission showed that 
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the vast majority of the existing collective redress mechanisms 
tend to have some elements that work, and some that do not. 
Almost all existing collective redress mechanisms have some 
added value compared to individual judicial redress and 
alternative dispute resolution schemes. But their efficiency 
and effectiveness could be improved. The mechanisms have 
been applied in relatively few cases.18 
10 A briefing paper of DG for Internal Policies for the 
European Parliament in 2011 came to the same 
conclusion and stated that “[t]hese differences point 
to disparities between the accessibility of collective 
redress to European consumers in different countries 
and sectors. European consumers are confronted with 
a complex legal patchwork of solutions which are 
applied by some Member States but not by others.”19
11 Several Member States have introduced a mechanism 
that permits consumer organisations to start a legal 
procedure on behalf of the collective interests of 
consumers. For instance, in France, Article L421-1 
of the Code de la Consommation (Consumer Code) 
stipulates that “Duly declared associations whose 
statutory object specifies the protection of consumer 
interests may, if they are approved for this purpose, 
exercise the rights conferred upon civil parties in 
respect of events directly, or indirectly, prejudicing the 
collective interest of consumers”. This implies that 
only recognised consumer organisations can start 
a court procedure. In 2004, the French consumer 
organisation Union Fédéral de Consommateurs (UFC) 
challenged the ToU of the Internet service provider 
AOL France. The Court judged that 31 of the 36 
clauses were in breach of French law.20 One of the 
provisions deemed illegal by the UFC was a clause 
whereby the client had to indemnify AOL France 
for all complaints and costs, including and without 
limitation of the reasonable legal fees. The court 
classified this provision as too broad because it did 
not define ‘reasonable costs’ and it did not give the 
possibility to determine the costs for the client. The 
ToU of AOL France also contained a cap on its own 
liability equal to the last six months of fees paid by 
the user. This was judged illegal by the court because 
it was in breach of the Code de la Consommation, which 
stipulates that it is inappropriate to exclude or limit 
the consumer’s legal rights in respect of the business 
or another party in the event of total, or partial, 
failure to perform, or defective performance by the 
business of any one of the contractual obligations. 
In March 2014, the French consumer organisation 
Que Choisir? filed a lawsuit with the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance in Paris with regard to the ToU of Google, 
Facebook and Twitter, and their privacy policies in 
particular.21 The judgment is expected later this year.
12 In Germany, certain consumer organisations can 
start a judicial procedure under Article 1 of the 
Unterlassungsklagengesetz for infringing standard 
contract terms and practices that infringe consumer 
protection legislation, excluding data protection 
regulation. A new draft bill would extend this 
competence to claims under data protection laws.22 
Only qualified consumer organisations may make 
use of this article: 
associations with legal personality for the promotion of 
commercial interests, insofar as their membership includes 
a considerable number of businesses marketing goods or 
commercial services of the same or a similar type on the 
same market, insofar as their staffing, material and financial 
resources enable them actually to perform the interest 
promotion functions laid down in their statutes.23 
13 However, the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. 
(VZBV), a non-governmental organisation that acts 
as an umbrella for 41 consumer organisations,24 
has successfully challenged several data protection 
terms. This was only possible if the privacy policy of 
the company could be considered part of the general 
ToU.25 With regard to SNS in particular, the VZBV 
challenged several clauses of the ToU of Facebook. 
The Berlin District Court found the following terms 
to be invalid: the copyright license, the use of 
the name and profile picture in connection with 
advertising and commercial content, the vagueness 
in the wording of the termination clause (“violates the 
letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise creates risk 
or possible legal exposure for Facebook”).26 In November 
2013, the Berlin regional court declared 25 clauses 
of Google’s ToU unlawful, including the liability 
clause, the term that stipulated that the company 
reserved the right to check, change and delete all 
data submitted in their services; the right to directly 
access a device in order to remove applications; as 
well as the right to completely cease to provide 
functions and features at their will.27 
14 In Belgium, certain consumer organisations also 
may start a representative action on behalf of an 
unidentified group of people in order to defend 
collective consumers’ interests. For instance, the 
consumer organisation Test Aankoop sued Apple 
over its one-year warranty policy. Test Aankoop 
claimed it was in contradiction with European law 
that demands a two-year warranty for consumer 
electronics. In response to the claim that was filed, 
Apple changed its policy, now giving two years of 
warranty for its products.28
15 In the last decade, the European Commission has 
taken several steps to adopt a coherent approach 
towards collective redress mechanisms. In its 
Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013, the Commission 
stressed the importance of consumer redress: 
If consumers are to have sufficient confidence in shopping 
outside their own Member State and take advantage of the 
internal market, they need assurance that if things go wrong 
they have effective mechanisms to seek redress. Consumer 
disputes require tailored mechanisms that do not impose costs 
and delays disproportionate to the value at stake.29 
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16 The studies in this domain (supra) showed that the 
situation in the EU was unsatisfactory (supra).30 As a 
follow-up on the Green Paper, a consultation paper 
was published in 2009, presenting a first working 
analysis of the impact of policy options designed in 
the light of the replies to the Green Paper and inviting 
stakeholders to provide further information.31 
17 In February 2012, the European Parliament adopted 
the resolution “Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress” in which it welcomed 
the Commission’s efforts to establish a coherent 
European approach to collective redress but at 
the same time stressed that the Commission “must 
respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
with regard to any proposal that does not fall within the 
exclusive competence of the Union”.32 
18 In June 2013 the Commission adopted a package 
of three documents: a Communication,33 a 
Recommendation34 and a proposal for a Directive 
on competition damages.35 The Recommendation 
states that all Member States should install collective 
redress mechanisms and take the necessary measures 
that are set out in this Recommendation and at the 
latest two years after its publication. Furthermore, 
Member States should ensure that the collective 
redress procedures are fair, equitable, timely and not 
prohibitively expensive. The goal of the Commission 
is not to harmonize but “to list some common, non-
binding, principles that Member States should take 
into account when crafting such mechanisms”.36 The 
package of the Commission has been received with 
mixed results, with questions raised as to whether 
this truly is a step forward in the collective redress 
process.37 According to Hodges, the package of 
proposals “reveals severe political compromises and 
serious fault lines”.38  He acknowledges that the rights 
of all parties are respected, that it provides some 
robust safeguards against abusive litigation and that 
economic incentives to bring speculative claims. 
However, he considers the Recommendation’s 
list of safeguards to be porous and unenforceable. 
Moreover, the key factors that affect collective 
litigation are controlled at the national level. In his 
view, the package will not achieve a level playing 
field and continued diversity will promote forum 
shopping between jurisdictions.39 For Stadler, an 
important gap is “the failure to provide clear rules for 
cross-border cases”.40
19 Given the current fragmented situation, it seems 
that using a collective redress mechanism to enforce 
their rights is not an obvious choice for European 
SNS users. Not all Member States have already 
introduced such procedures; even in Member States 
that have, the procedures seem to be underused. 
Up until now, there have been just a few cases 
against SNS that were introduced by consumer 
organisations, mainly in Germany and France (supra). 
The underuse of collective redress mechanisms in an 
SNS environment may be attributed to a general lack 
of awareness, not only for individual consumers but 
also for consumer organisations. Because of the ‘free’ 
nature of the services and the fact that the negative 
impact of certain terms is not directly tangible, both 
users and consumer organisations may feel that 
action is not immediately necessary nor possible. 
However, given the impact and pervasive nature of 
SNS on daily life, we feel that both individual users 
and consumer organisations should be made aware 
of the importance of taking action in this field in 
case of infringements on fundamental rights, such 
as privacy or consumer rights. In addition, the 
fact that major SNS are established outside the 
EU41 makes it more difficult to start proceedings 
against these companies. Within the EU, disputes 
with a cross-border element are subject to the 
Brussels I Regulation, which lays down the rules 
for the jurisdiction and enforcement in civil and 
commercial matters.42 The purpose of the Regulation 
is to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments among Member States for internal market 
purposes.43 In principle, when an SNS is established 
outside the EU, the Regulation is not applicable.44 
The revision of the Brussels I Regulation has resulted 
in Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, which 
came into force as of 1 January 2013 and will be 
implemented as of 10 January 2015.45 Of importance 
is Article 18 (1): “a consumer may bring proceedings 
against the other party to a contract either in the courts 
of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or, 
regardless of the domicile of the other party, in the courts 
for the place where the consumer is domiciled.”46 This 
means that a consumer, as of the beginning of 2015, 
can bring a company that only has offices outside 
the EU before the courts of his domicile on the 
basis of Article 18. 47 However, the Regulation does 
not take into account the possibility of collective 
action implying, according to certain scholars, that 
a concentration of claims can only be brought in the 
court of the domicile of the defendant.48 According 
to Tang, the reason can be found in the fact that 
at the time of writing the Regulation, “there was no 
consideration to provide any special jurisdiction rules for 
this type of action.”49 This makes it very difficult to 
start a collective procedure against an SNS in a cross-
border dispute. In sum, at the moment, the use of 
collective redress mechanisms to enforce SNS users’ 
rights is still confronted with various obstacles.
II. Ex Ante: Pre-approved, Negotiated 
and Interactive Contracts 
20 Given the reluctance of users to go to court if their 
rights are violated,  the lack of awareness and 
questions about the practical implementation of 
ex post remedies to SNS-related issues, it may be 
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argued that other mechanisms should be introduced 
to protect users’ interests. In this section we will 
assess the option of ex ante remedies – mechanisms 
that entail an intervention before the user has to 
agree to the ToU. First, we examine the introduction 
of pre-approved contracts by a public authority or 
private interest groups, sometimes referred to as 
administrative control;50 second, we discuss the 
option of model form contracts that are negotiated 
by consumer and business interest groups. 
1. Pre-approval of contracts
21 The idea to introduce a certain control by a third 
party with regard to consumer contracts is not a new 
one. Already in 1970 in the USA, Arthur Leff proposed 
a type of direct governmental quality control.51 
While Leff advocated a statutory mechanism, other 
US scholars favoured an administrative intervention. 
For instance, Kaplow and Shavell suggested the 
idea of a legal body – possibly a regulatory agency 
– writing standard form contracts and even making 
it mandatory in certain settings.52 Bates was of the 
opinion that “a system of administrative regulation 
that certifies the validity of terms in form contracts (…) 
constitutes a better solution than one that depends on 
litigation (…).”53 Gillette followed this line of reasoning 
and considered a procedure that lets consumers and 
sellers submit a contract to an administrative agency 
that would be able to evaluate the validity of the 
provisions in that contract.54
22 Becher has developed an extensive model of pre-
approved contracts and based it on the idea of 
allowing third parties to review and approve 
standard contracts.55 The purpose of this system 
is to ensure that consumer contracts are drafted 
fairly and efficiently. He considers such an approval 
a quality certification, indicating that an approved 
contract meets both substantive (fairness, efficiency, 
cognitive biases) and procedural (font, colour, 
language, etc.) standards.56 Companies could get 
an approval for the whole contract or for part of 
the contract. The system would be voluntary, so 
incentives for companies to submit their contracts 
for approval are necessary. A possible incentive 
could be the immunisation against future claims if 
the contract were approved. The following aspects 
could be taken into account: the duration of the 
immunity; the scope of the immunity (which claims 
will be basically excluded from discussion when 
approved); the kind of evidence that is allowed 
and required in order to challenge the ordinary 
meaning of approved terms, etc.57 Gillette calls this 
immunisation a “safe harbour”.58
23 Becher finds that this would relieve consumers from 
their “theoretical duty to read the fine print”, economis-
ing their time and directing their attention to cru-
cial or problematic contracts that are not pre-ap-
proved and that could include problematic terms.59 
24 Although he finds that the system has many 
advantages, he also isolates several issues that have 
to be taken into account. First, he finds allowing 
partial approval of terms necessary. This is because 
consumers are a heterogeneous audience, and what 
might seem fair for some consumers may not be 
for other consumers. Also, companies will need 
incentives, and an “all-or-nothing” regime will likely 
have limited success. He argues that companies 
would rather accept the flexible framework of partial 
approval. For consumers, providing a system of “all-
or-nothing” would make things simpler: they would 
not have to survey contracts and read non-approved 
parts. Second, he assesses how the contract can be 
approved by the independent third party: binary, 
meaning approved or not, or by grading contracts. 
Becher prefers the binary option for several reasons, 
such as the difficulties in reaching a consistent 
manner of evaluating and grading the contracts and 
in who will do the grading, the party responsible for 
approving the contract or a consumer organisation.
25 It is possible to make the pre-approval of contracts 
a mandatory system. However, Becher sees different 
reasons to keep it voluntary, such as the significant 
resources that would be needed for an independent 
third party and a possible violation of the freedom 
to contract when pre-approval would be mandatory 
and the (probably) fierce opposition by interest 
groups that represent business interests. Given 
the network effects of SNS,60 we may assume that 
a dominant SNS provider is less likely to have an 
incentive to draft user-friendly ToU. In that case, 
a voluntary system may not be the ideal solution. 
Given that the reasons for opposing a mandatory 
system may indeed be valid, a middle course could 
be a co-regulatory system, which provides incentives 
for the providers to join the system but still attributes 
enough leeway for the concrete implementation and 
enforcement.
26 Finally, Becher takes into account some challenges 
and anticipates criticism his model may raise. He 
first addresses the issue of institutional identity. The 
system should be able to provide strong incentives to 
sellers to use it; hence, resources must be provided 
to optimise its functioning and enforcement capa-
bilities. Becher prefers a central institution backed 
by governmental funds, but acknowledges that be-
cause of the drawbacks, this system has other op-
tions such as non-profit organisations that should 
be looked into as well. A second issue that is raised 
is whether a new institution is really necessary, or 
whether an already existing organisation could also 
be an option. The use of an existing organisation 
could significantly reduce costs and benefit from the 
expertise and knowledge already available. Becher 
proposed the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
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an independent agency with the objective to protect 
consumers, as a possibility.61 In Europe, consumer or-
ganisations at the national level or European level 
(such as BEUC) could take up this role. 
27 An implementation of the pre-approval of contracts 
can be found in Israel. In 1964, a regulatory system 
was established in which standard contracts were 
regulated directly through legislation and whereby a 
dual layer of judicial and administrative control was 
established.62 Individuals and businesses can submit 
a contract for approval. If a term is invalidated, this 
does not affect the validity of other terms in the 
contract or the enforceability of the contract as a 
whole.63 
28 However, the success of the system is limited. 
The 1964 law generated only sixty submissions. 
Therefore, the system was revised in 1982 with the 
purpose of increasing incentives for sellers. Despite 
the improvements, the success remains low. Gillette 
contends that the reasons for limited success are not 
clear and may not be transferable to other states.64 
However, both Becher and Gillette point to the risk 
of free-riding.65 
29 This risk of free-riding may exist because, once 
approved, contracts may be readily available to 
other parties who have not contributed to the 
process of obtaining approval.66 Gillette considers 
the submission by a trade organisation a possible 
alternative to avoid the free-riding problem.
30 Other risks that may be identified are related to cost, 
more specifically that this cost would be passed on to 
consumers. 67  In the case of SNS, which are offered to 
users on a ‘free’ basis, we may wonder how a transfer 
of cost would be calculated. An option may be that 
users will be subjected to more advertisements. 
Becher disagrees that cost will be problematic and 
is of the opinion that the “significance of the problems 
associated with the Standard Form Contracts cannot 
easily be exaggerated, especially when keeping in mind 
the more vulnerable groups of consumers”. Creating 
such a system would promote trust and confidence 
between companies and consumers and would 
reduce transaction costs for companies and increase 
public confidence. According to Becher, however, for 
companies, the instalment of such a system would 
reduce some expenses and increase profits. And 
though it may result in higher prices, consumers 
may avoid provisions that they do not know how to 
evaluate correctly. Finally, as the mechanism would 
be voluntary, if a consumer does not want to pay the 
higher price, he or she still can choose to use the 
products or services of a company that does not have 
an approved contract and which offers a lower price. 
31 Another objection could be the fact that since all 
companies will offer the same set of approved 
terms, consumers would be denied the possibility 
of ‘shopping’ for different terms. However, this 
argument assumes that consumers actually do 
shop for contract terms, which is something that is 
questionable, for instance in the case of SNS. 
32 Luth points to incentives for consumers, in particular 
whether a contract’s sign of approval, like a quality 
label, will be something users will base their decision 
on. Individual terms may not be a relevant feature 
for a user, but the overall quality of the ToU might 
be. However, because of network effects (supra), SNS 
markets often contain a dominant player. So even 
when there is a SNS that is more user-friendly in 
its ToU and privacy policy, it might not make sense 
to users to be a part of that network when all their 
friends are members of another SNS with less user-
friendly terms. 
III. Negotiated contracts
33 Another ex ante mechanism is the negotiating of 
standard terms that would eventually result in a 
model form contract. Consumers, including SNS 
users, could be involved in the drafting process, for 
instance through consumer organisations,68 in this 
way also aiming to concretise participatory policy-
making objectives that have been put forward at 
the European level.69 According to Luth, this policy 
option would have the “potential of improving quality 
of terms beyond the level of excluding onerous terms”. 
Also, information and expertise of both businesses 
and consumer groups may be used to come to a 
real understanding about the terms in consumer 
contracts.70 The idea in itself is not new. Based on 
experiences in the Netherlands and Sweden, in 2000 
the European Commission considered the possibility 
to encourage the establishment of systems that 
“encourage the negotiation and discussion of terms with 
the professionals”.71 These kind of negotiated model 
contracts could be subject to self- or co-regulation.72
34 Examples of this approach can be found in the Nordic 
Countries – Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
– which have installed a special state authority 
to enforce consumers’ collective interests: the 
Consumer Ombudsman.73 According to Viitanen, a 
typical feature of the Nordic system of consumer 
protection is the “frequent use of preventive actions 
in the supervision of marketing and standard terms”. 
He distinguishes three instruments: advance 
opinions, marketing guidelines and negotiations 
with trade organisations concerning standard 
terms. The purpose of these instruments is to 
avoid infringements of law by informing traders 
and by negotiating with them. In addition, these 
instruments are not prescribed by law, but have 
been created through practice over the years.74 
The Nordic Ombudsmen can start negotiations in 
several branches of business with the respective 
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trade organisations. For the traders, there is the 
advantage that the Consumer Ombudsman is less 
likely to take actions against negotiated contract 
terms. For consumers, these negotiations could add 
provisions which improve consumers’ contractual 
position compared to standard terms that were 
used before or even compared to the mandatory 
consumer contract law provisions.75 
35 According to Viitanen, there are several positive 
elements about the Nordic approach. First, the only 
task of Consumer Ombudsman is the enforcement 
of consumer protection. This means that this 
body has been able to focus all available resources 
on consumer protection without the fear that 
the fulfilment of other tasks would get the upper 
hand. Second, the wide use of preventive actions 
and persuasion has been very successful, and most 
traders have been more willing to co-operate. He 
considers the main reason for this willingness in the 
possibility of hard law sanctions when persuasion 
fails: “without the possibility to use hard law sanctions 
if necessary, the persuasive methods would not be so 
successful as they have been now in practice”.76
36 In the Netherlands, the Social and Economic Council 
(SER) provides business and consumer organisations 
with an open framework to negotiate balanced ToU. 
One of the statutory tasks of the SER is to “promote 
desirable trends in business and industry”.77 To achieve 
this goal, the SER encourages business and consumer 
organisations to start negotiations over ToU that are 
satisfactory for both parties. This is a self-regulatory 
process which ideally leads to the establishment 
of Consumer Complaints Boards composed of 
representatives of business and consumers. 
37 A business organisation or consumer organisation 
can take the initiative to start negotiations about the 
ToU in a particular sector. If a bilateral agreement is 
reached, the business is allowed to use the standard 
clause of the SER which precedes the ToU.78 This 
provision states that the terms were negotiated with 
the Consumentenbond, the general Dutch Consumer’s 
organisation within the framework of the SER.79 The 
number of sector consumer organisations that are 
involved in the negotiations is increasing.80 In the 
framework of this mechanism, on the one hand, 
consumers know that the ToU for a particular 
sector have been carefully considered, hence 
strengthening their legal position. Businesses, on 
the other hand, have ToU that generate trust with 
consumers. In addition, balanced ToU may help to 
avoid conflicts between consumers and businesses.81 
For the government, this kind of mechanism has the 
advantage that its only task is to create the basic 
framework in which the system will operate.82 
38 Luth finds several advantages with the mechanism 
of negotiated contracts.83 First, the fact that both 
consumers and businesses are represented in the 
negotiations would allow for competing interests 
to be taken into account in the final model contract. 
Second, if these contracts have been negotiated 
under fair procedures, it can be expected that the 
terms will be fair and sensitive to the particular 
interests of the stakeholders. Third, because 
consumers have a voice in the negotiation through a 
representative, this should generate standard terms 
that are more likely to correspond to consumer 
preferences than one-sided ToU would. However, 
ensuring representativeness may involve some 
technical, financial and organisational assistance. 
Fourth, when consumers are given the chance to 
influence the content of standard terms, the quality 
of the ToU may rise. Finally, enforcement costs of 
regulatory agencies and courts to guarantee that 
companies use fair contract provisions will be lower.
39 A drawback of the system could be that starting 
negotiations and adopting negotiated contracts will 
be more costly in expense and effort for companies 
for whom it is cheaper to adopt low-quality ToU. 
Nonetheless, Luth84 finds some incentives that can 
persuade companies. First, the drafting costs of 
ToU would be diminished because of the negotiated 
contract. Costs are also saved because the terms 
of the negotiated standard form contract are less 
likely to be challenged in court and even if they were 
challenged, the chances of being upheld by the judge 
are higher. Second, a negotiated contract provides 
predictability and certainty about the legal validity 
of the terms. Third, it can be regarded as a token 
of consumer friendliness and could enhance trust 
between consumers and companies. Within the same 
context, reputation and public goodwill could also 
be an important incentive for companies to adhere 
to the negotiated standard contract. Finally, from a 
business perspective, because these contracts have 
been negotiated by representatives of the sector, 
companies may rely on the fact that these documents 
have been developed with business interests in mind 
as well. 
40 The attraction of negotiated ToU could be boosted by 
making the process of negotiation and obtaining the 
approved model not too costly and strenuous on the 
part of the companies. However, when the terms are 
easy to obtain and not all companies that use them 
have contributed to the negotiations, there is, again, 
the risk of free-riding. Therefore, Luth proposes a 
kind of funding mechanism for these negotiations in 
order to avoid free-riders. Another mechanism that 
could strengthen the use of negotiated terms is the 
enhancement of enforcement against one-sided and 
onerous provisions. In addition, companies could be 
granted a more favourable position when confronted 
with a claim against the model ToU, giving them a 
higher chance to win a dispute when they stick to 
a model form contract and resulting in lower legal 
costs. 
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IV. The use of interactive contracts
41 A point of criticism that is voiced with regard to pre-
approved or negotiated contracts is that consumers 
will no longer have a chance to shop for different 
contracts. A way of responding to this critique may 
be found in the use of interactive contracts. The 
idea is that this kind of contract will take the form 
of a standardised contract, but that certain parts 
of the agreement can be modulated by the users.85 
These modular provisions will be pre-drafted by the 
company. The drafting party has to decide which 
terms have to be customisable. For instance, an SNS 
could specify to its users where to store their personal 
data, the applicable law of the contract or the license 
conditions for the user’s intellectual property.86 The 
seller may provide these customisations for free or 
at a cost and must decide which will be the default 
setting for each modular provision. Finally, the seller 
must draft its interactive contract in such a way that 
it invites consumer interaction. If possible, the seller 
may also submit its contract for approval with a third 
party, or negotiate balanced terms with consumer 
organisations (supra). 
42 According to Chen, the use of interactive contracts 
allows for the avoidance of efficiency losses that 
sellers and users may experience when using 
completely standardised agreements.87 For instance, 
in the case of a standard contract, and in particular 
in the case of a pre-approved or negotiated contract, 
a user that is willing to pay more for a specific 
provision cannot do this because  the terms are non-
negotiable. With an interactive contract, the seller is 
able to offer terms that are more desirable for a user 
– for instance, a lower price for a shorter warranty 
period. Since it is known that users usually do not 
read ToU (supra), interactive contracts may provide 
an incentive to actually do so. ToU are traditionally 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and users may 
feel that they have no control. In this way, users who 
want to shop for terms and care about what is in 
the ToU can exert some form of control over the 
contract they are agreeing to.88 
43 An objection to this kind of contracts is the cost. 
Devising an adjustable contract that is properly 
drafted will take time and effort and will hence be 
more expensive than traditional ToU. As Chen states: 
“attorneys must consider all the different variations in 
provisions and how these provisions will interact with 
each other when combined in various ways”.89 Sellers 
also have to be careful to make the contract not 
too customisable. Users may not be given too much 
choice. Research has suggested that a choice overload 
may lead to frustration and demotivation.90 Factors 
that influence the actual interactivity of the contract 
are the way the customisable terms are presented91 
and the degree to which users interact with each 
other. With regard to the latter, SNS allow users to 
easily communicate amongst each other about the 
ToU and their modularity, letting the few users that 
actually do read the ToU easily contact others and 
express their thoughts on these terms.92 
1.1. The role of consumer organisations
44 Given the heterogeneity and differences in 
preferences, organisations that represent users 
and consumers might be best placed to defend and 
promote their interests, also in the SNS environment. 
This would allow the voice of users being heard when 
SNS draw up ToU. In general, these organisations 
have better access to resources and expertise 
than individual consumers. They can also provide 
information and advice and can take preventive or 
ex post measures, like starting a collective redress 
procedure. 
45 However, there are some elements that have to 
be taken into account. It is argued that consumer 
participation in the EU is limited and outweighed 
by the influence of business interest groups.93 
In addition, although consumer organisations 
express consumers’ interests, their impact on 
policy is sometimes considered to be limited and 
their membership is relatively small.94 Consumer 
interests themselves may be very diverse as the 
consumer group is large and diverse to start with. 
Correspondingly, differences between consumer 
organisations may result in various focus points 
between the organisations. The existence of 
multiple organisations which each have their own 
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area of expertise could make it very difficult to 
cooperate and could result in the lack of a coherent 
consumer voice, which could force regulators to 
approach a large number of organisations in order 
to obtain the correct consumer input. Another 
issue that consumer organisations are confronted 
with is the lack of resources. This is aggravated 
by the disparity with business organisations.95 In 
order to succeed in their tasks, according to Dayag-
Epstein, consumer organisations should be properly 
trained, properly funded and cooperate with fellow 
consumer organisations, not only nationally but 
also with other countries or on a European level. 
In certain legal systems, a public authority might 
be better or equally suited to represent consumers’ 
interests. For instance, in the Nordic countries the 
Ombudsmen negotiate with trade organisations 
because consumer organisations in these regions 
are rather weak. Which party would be best placed 
to defend consumers will depend on the institutional 
arrangements and existence of competent consumer 
organisations in the respective legal systems.96 
46 Yet SNS often operate on a global level, making 
it difficult for national initiatives to succeed in 
improving SNS users position vis-à-vis SNS providers 
on a general level. We believe that European 
and international organisations that advocate 
consumer rights, such as the BEUC or Consumers 
International,97 could play an important part in 
putting these concerns on the European policy 
agenda on the one hand, and that the European 
Commission could take up a mediating role between 
these organisations and large SNS, such as Facebook, 
on the other hand.
B. Conclusion
47 It is a general phenomenon that SNS users have a 
lack of awareness about and understanding of the 
ToU they have agreed to when creating a profile. 
In addition, it is possible that (parts of) these 
agreements may not  be enforceable under European 
law, because they create a significant imbalance 
between SNS providers and their users. In this paper 
we assessed several mechanisms that could help to 
restore this imbalance. 
48 First, there are ex post mechanisms which can be 
used after an issue has arisen. The most obvious one 
is starting a legal procedure before a court. However, 
because of the relatively low value of consumer 
claims in comparison to the costs and efforts of a 
judicial procedure, most consumers do not act upon 
complaints they may have. There are different 
mechanisms that try to provide alternatives to 
traditional individual legal proceedings, such as 
collective redress mechanisms. Our analysis has 
shown that while these mechanisms may seem 
promising, they are still in their infancy, in many 
cases fragmented and not adapted (enough) to cross-
border disputes. In addition, awareness of users 
and consumer organisations about these ex post 
mechanisms should be increased first and foremost. 
First, users need to be aware that they have rights 
and that they can actually take action when they 
feel that their rights have been infringed by SNS 
providers. Second, users need to be aware that there 
are different redress mechanisms that they can use. 
A long-term and sustainable awareness strategy 
should be created by the EU or national governments, 
in cooperation with consumer organisations, to 
inform users about their rights. This approach could 
also prove helpful with regard to other consumer 
protection issues where the interests of consumers 
are at stake. 
49 We have also taken into account the option of ex 
ante schemes, which take a part of the responsibility 
away from the users and transfer it to the service 
providers and third parties such as consumer 
organisations.
50 We have discussed, first, pre-approved and, second, 
negotiated contracts, which may incorporate users’ 
interests by introducing business and consumer 
organisations in the contract-making process. 
However, both mechanisms may suffer from the 
free-riding problem and the issue of cost. Pre-
approving or negotiating will take more effort and 
will likely be more costly than using standard ToU 
that are readily available. Furthermore, there is 
the possibility that consumers, once aware of the 
existence of this type of contract, will never read 
ToU again because they think they are signing a 
user-friendly agreement each time. When not all 
companies in a certain sector adhere to the system, 
and users assume they are part of this negotiated 
agreement, they risk ending up with a contract that 
does not take the consumers’ interests seriously. 
This implies that awareness-raising of users should 
be an important priority. The use of pre-approved 
and negotiated contracts may be criticised because it 
does not provide users with an opportunity to shop 
around for better terms. An interesting alternative 
may be the use of interactive contracts that allow for 
a certain amount of customisation. These contracts 
may also use pre-approved or negotiated contract 
terms whereby both the default terms and the 
modular terms can be discussed. This will allow for 
ToU that are balanced in the default as well as in 
the customised setting. Moreover, it gives users the 
opportunity to choose terms that reflect the values 
that are important to them (e.g. high or lower level 
of privacy). In order to decide whether such a system 
could be feasible in an SNS environment, more 
social/behavioural and legal research is necessary as 
well as a thorough and realistic cost-benefit analysis 
of the various systems.
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51 To conclude, we have stressed that awareness-
raising of users is a key issue, both for ex ante and 
ex post mechanisms. In addition, incentives should 
be created for SNS providers to adopt more user-
friendly terms in general and, for instance, to submit 
them to an approval or negotiation process. To 
achieve this, supranational pressure, for instance 
from the European Commission, will be more 
effective than fragmented national initiatives. Action 
at the EU level would also lead to a more harmonised 
approach, and hence more legal certainty for users. 
Next to the Commission, consumer organisations 
and other civil society organisations that represent 
users’ interests also have an important role to play 
in generating awareness about rights and obligations 
of SNS users and taking action when these rights at 
stake.
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